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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CML RIGHTS-SOLITARY CONFINEMENT OF
PRISONERS BASED ON RELIGIOUS BELIEFS-Plaintiff prisoner brought an
action in a federal district court under the Civil Rights Act1 to enjoin the
defendant, a New York state prison warden, from further subjecting him to
solitary confinement because of his religious beliefs. The district court
refused to take jurisdiction on the ground that solitary confinement involved state prison discipline which was reviewable only in state courts. On
appeal, held, reversed, one judge dissenting.2 A complaint by a prisoner
against a state prison official which charges violation of a "preferred
freedom" by religious persecution states a claim under the Civil Rights Act
which the district court must entertain. Pierce v. LaVallee, 293 F.2d 233
(2d Cir. 1961).
Lawful imprisonment deprives a prisoner of certain constitutional rights
and privileges of citizenship,3 but does not withdraw from him every
protection of the law. 4 Imprisonment does not of itself deprive the prisoner
of the right to invoke the Civil Rights Act for the protection of rights
guaranteed by the federal govemment.5 A federal court has the power to
grant relief under the broad language of the act which vests jurisdiction
in the federal courts for any civil action commenced for the redress of a
deprivation of constitutional rights. 6 But when the complaint of a prisoner
involves only disciplinary measures which do not violate constitutional
rights, no judicial relief is available at the federal level. Federal courts have
no power to intervene in the ordinary management and control of either
state prisons7 or federal prisons.8
1 Action was brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1958) , which provides for a civil remedy in cases involving the deprivation of rights by
persons acting under color of state law, and under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1958), which vests
jurisdiction in the federal district courts over civil actions commenced by any persons
for the redress of the deprivation of rights protected under the Constitution or acts of
Congress. See Comment, 56 MICH. L. REv. 619 (1958) for a general discussion of the
Civil Rights Act.
2 The dissenting judge argued that the issue had been abandoned in the trial court.
Principal case at 236.
3 See Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948) (dictum); Edgerly v. Kennelly, 215
F.2d 420, 423 (7th Cir. 1954) (dictum), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 938 (1955).
4 E.g., Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1945) (unlawful restraint of
personal liberty subject to habeas corpus inquiry).
5 E.g., Siegel v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 785, 787-88 (7th Cir. 1950) (dictum) ; Mccollum v.
Mayfield, 130 F. Supp. 112, 116-17 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
6 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1958), summarized in note 1 supra.
7 E.g., State of Oregon ex rel. Sherwood v. Gladden, 240 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1957);
United States ex rel. Atterbury v. Ragen, 237 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1956); United States ex
rel. Wagner v. Ragen, 213 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1954) ; Siegel v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 785 (7th
Cir. 1950); Curtis v. Jacques, 130 F. Supp. 920 (W.D. Mich. 1954); Piccoli v. Board of
Trustees, 87 F. Supp. 672 (D.N.H. 1949) •
8 E.g., Tabor v. Hardwick, 224 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1955); Dayton v. McGranery, 201
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While federal court intervention under the Civil Rights Act to protect
constitutional rights may be justified in situations involving federal prisons,9
the traditionally more restricted application of the act to circumstances in
which federal-state relations are involved must necessarily be considered
before similar intervention is taken at the state level. The Supreme Court
has indicated that the act should be construed narrowly in order to respect
the balance of interest between the states and federal government in law
enforcement.10 A court of equity has discretionary power to refuse to
exercise equitable relief under the Civil Rights Act when this balance might
be disturbed. 11 This consideration has led most federal courts to refuse to
take jurisdiction of complaints which allege that prison discipline in state
penal institutions has violated constitutional rights. Decisions have often
emphasized that available state remedies should be pursued and exhausted
before a federal court will even consider taking jurisdiction.12 Other cases
have held that there must be a substantial interference with an important
constitutional right before a federal court will intervene in matters relating
to discipline in state prisons. 13 The latter approach acknowledges that a
state may unconstitutionally infringe upon certain "minor" rights with
impunity insofar as the federal courts are concerned.14 One case has even
implied that, notwithstanding a violation of constitutional rights, a federal
court should refuse to intervene under any circumstances.15 A factor underF.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1951); Sturm v.
McGrath, 177 F.2d 472 (10th Cir. 1949); Numer v. Miller, 165 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1948).
Congress has entrusted the responsibility of prison discipline to the executive under
18 u.s.c. § 4001 (1958).
9 Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961). In this case the discipline infringed
upon the prisoner's religious freedom. The circuit court distinguished cases involving
ordinary managerial measures by pointing out that the complaint attacked prison
discipline, not because of the infraction of a rule, but solely because of the prisoner's
religion.
10 Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 121 (1951) (dictum).
11 Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
12 Kelly v. Dowd, 140 F.2d 81, 83 (7th Cir. 1944). See also Siegel v. Ragen, 180 F.2d
785, 788 (7th Cir. 1950); Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 304 U.S.
209, 223 (1938) (dictum). Kelly v. Dowd, supra, involved the same problem as the
principal case, a claim of religious persecution in the denial of a prisoner's right of
access to religious materials. It is significant that the district court dismissed a complaint
alleging denial of access to religious materials, while the district court in the principal
case accepted the same issue-denial to purchase the Koran-although dismissing the
other issues.
13 Nichols v. McGee, 169 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Cal. 1959). See also Piccoli v. Board of
Trustees, 87 F. Supp. 672 (D.N.H. 1949); Bowers v. Calkins, 84 F. Supp. 272, 279
(D.N.H. 1949).
14 This approach should be clearly distinguished from that normally employed to test
the constitutionality of state action which balances the respective interests of the state
and the individual. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). In declining
jurisdiction in cases of violation of "minor" rights, the federal courts refuse to intervene
despite the unconstitutionality of the state action.
15 United States ex rel. Morris v. Radio Station WENR, 209 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1953).
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lying all of these approaches is the judicial focus on and concern with the
state interest in prison administration and discipline rather than the
violation of federally guaranteed rights.16 Once a dispute can be characterized as one involving prison discipline, the federal courts seem to find
it relatively easy to defer jurisdiction to the state courts. This approach has
given rise to a situation in which the federal courts admit the relevancy of
the Civil Rights Act in general, but almost unanimously deny its applicability in any particular case. In fact, aside from the principal case, only one
federal court has entertained a state prisoner's claim that aspects of prison
discipline violated his constitutional rights.17 This court recognized the
state interest in the maintenance of prison discipline but held that such
disciplinary measures should not constitute a deprivation of civil rights.
Similarly, the court in the principal case has chosen to emphasize the
violation of a constitutional right rather than the state interest in prison
discipline. The court denied that matters involving prison discipline are
immune from federal intervention, and was not swayed by the plaintiff's
failure to pursue a purportedly adequate state remedy.18 However, the
principal case fails to provide a satisfactory guide for determining what
constitutional rights of prisoners in state penal institutions are deserving
of federal protection. The court emphasized that the right violated was
freedom of religion, characterizing it as a "preferred freedom." This
characterization presumably refers to the "preferred position" doctrine
whereby first amendment rights are sometimes given special consideration
and protection by the judiciary.19 A reference to the "preferred freedom"
doctrine may indicate that the court is adopting the view that certain
See also United States ex rel. Atterbury v. Ragen, 237 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1956); United
States ex rel. Wagner v. Ragen, 213 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1954); Curtis v. Jacques, 130
F. Supp. 920 (W.D. Mich. 1954). United States ex rel. Morris v. Radio Station WENR,
supra, and Nichols v. McGee, 169 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Cal. 1959), involved claims by
Negro prisoners that they were denied the equal protection of the law.
16 Compare Bailleaux v. Holmes, 177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1959) with Piccoli v.
Board of Trustees, 87 F. Supp. 672 (D.N.H. 1949). These cases involved similar facts, the
imposition of excessive restrictions on the obtaining of law books. Bailleaux v. Holmes,
supra, entertained the prisoner's claim by emphasizing the relation of deprivation of
legal materials and denial of access to the courts. Full access to the courts had previously
been recognized as a guaranteed right. White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945); Ex parte
Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941). But Piccoli v. Board of Trustees supra, viewed the conflict
solely as one of prison discipline and therefore denied relief.
17 Bailleaux v. Holmes, supra note 16, at 362. Jurisdiction has been granted over a
number of claims against police officers and prison officials for damages arising out of
unlawful acts during periods of imprisonment. E.g., Coleman v. Johnston, 247 F.2d 273
(7th Cir. 1957); McCollum v. May.field, 130 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
18 Prisoners may sue to secure their rights to religious liberty in the supreme court
of the state district in which the prisoner is incarcerated. N.Y. CoRREc. LAw § 610.
19 See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-95 (1949), in which Mr. Justice Frankfurter
reviews the preferred position doctrine at some length; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147,
161 (1939); Cahn, The Firstness of the First Amendment, 65 YALE L.J. 464 (1956) •
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"minor" rights may be suspended. Such an approach seems undesirable.
The "preferred position" doctrine itself has been seriously questioned.20
Its use in this context leaves the serious problem of determining which
rights are "minor" and which "preferred" unanswered. One may question,
for example, whether it can properly be held that a prisoner's right to be
free of religious discrimination is more important than the right to be
free from racial discrimination.21 While use of the "preferred freedom"
doctrine in the principal case provides a handy tool to find that this
particular right should be protected, it provides no satisfactory guide for
future cases which may involve deprivation of other constitutional rights.
A federal court, in deciding whether it will take jurisdiction of the
claims of a state prisoner, must determine initially whether the case involves
only questions of prison discipline or whether it also involves an interference
with, or deprivation of, constitutional rights. Without such an interference
or deprivation, a federal court, of course, has no power to intervene. But
if federally guaranteed rights are found to be invaded by prison disciplinary
action, the court must then decide the difficult question of whether it should
exercise its discretionary power to grant relief. An attempt to classify rights
as "minor" or "preferred" seems a difficult one which would be best
avoided. In the first instance a federal court ought to determine only
whether there has been a violation of a protected constitutional right. Any
"weighing" process should be reserved for the other factors involved in the
determination of whether a claim should be entertained, essentially the
extent of the violation and the availability of state relief. It may well be
that an alleged violation is so insubstantial as not to support federal
intervention. And, the availability of a covenient state remedy may be a
factor weighing against intervention in light of the oft-repeated dictum
that the state courts too are charged with the obligation to recognize and
protect constitutional rights.22 The impact of this latter factor has been
weakened by a recent Supreme Court decision holding that the state remedy
need not be sought first, and refused, before a federal one is properly
granted. 23 This decision may indicate that an adequate state remedy should
be used as a basis for non-intervention only when practicalities dictate that
it would be more convenient to hold the trial in the state court. But,
importantly, a federal court should not use as a basis for non-intervention
the characterization of an action as disciplinary when that action has also
violated a protected constitutional right. Such a characterization may be a
20 See Kovacs v. Cooper, supra note 19, at 89-97 (concurring opinion) • The fact that
the term "preferred" was placed in quotation marks may indicate that the court itself
bas doubts about its doctrinal status. Principal case at 235.
21 Compare principal case with Nichols v. McGee, 169 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Cal. 1959)
and United States ex rel. Morris v. Radio Station WENR, 209 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1953).
22 E.g., Kelly v. Dowd, 140 F.2d 81, 82 (7th Cir. 1944).
23 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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convenient vehicle by which to escape the otherwise difficult task of
determining whether federal court intervention is justified, but it is also in
effect a surrender of the power and duty of the federal courts to protect
constitutional rights.24
Harvey Friedman

24 The New York court recently held that previous criminal connections of certain
Black Muslim members did not warrant prison officials' alleged denial of access to
"religious" advice. Brown v. McGinnis, 10 N.Y.2d 531,225 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1962).

